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According to John Stuart Mill, "abolitionists, in America mean those
who do not keep within the Constitution."' "On Independance Day in
1854, at Farringham, Massachusetts, Garrison, at an abolitionist gathering,
publicly burned the Constitution of the United States, crying, 'So perish
all compromise with tyranny.' "2 In 1842 John Quincy Adams successfully
defeated a Congressional attempt to censure him for moving to refer to
committee a petition "asking Congress to adopt measures breaking up the
Union of free and slave states."13 In a letter written to his daughter in
1840, Joshua Giddings, leader of abolitionist forces in Congress, unwit-
tingly revealed the degree to which abolition of slavery and destruction
of the Union had become joined together in the public mind. He wrote
that, in spite of all the abolition talk, "I don't see that the Union is yet
dissolved."
The widely held belief that abolitionists meant to destroy the union was
not completely unjustified. Many abolitionists were uncompromising in
their bitter attacks on the Constitution. Garrison called it "a covenant
with death and an agreement with hell." Wendell Phillips said it was "a
wall hastily built, in hard times, of round boulders . . . a 'hodge-podge'
a general mess, a bowl of punch, of all the instititutions of the na-
tion." Frederick Douglass said, "Liberty and Slavery-opposite as Heaven
and Hell-are both in the Constitution; and the oath to support the latter
is an oath to perform that which God has made impossible . . . If we
adopt the preamble, with Liberty and Justice, we must repudiate the en-
acting clauses, with Kidnapping and Slaveholding. ' 5
Douglass set out the specific charge. Abolitionists, he said, saw the
Constitution as "a compromise with slavery-a bargain between the North
and South." 6 For evidence to support their charge, the opponents of slav-
ery cited the Constitution itself. That document gave the South extra polit-
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ical power in the House by counting each slave as three-fifths (3/5) of a
person in apportioning congressional seats.7 It allowed the slave trade to
exist at least 20 years past the creation of the Union.8 It required the re-
turn of fugitive slaves in accordance with rules of Congress.9 This array
of constitutional power gave the South substantial support in its efforts to
keep slavery alive.
The mere existence of these powers in the Constitution was enough to
condemn the document to many Abolitionists. But further proof was added
to their case in 1840 when Madison's notes on the Constitutional Conven-
tion were published. In these papers, abolitionists found dramatic evi-
dence of what they had claimed all along. "The great danger to our gen-
eral government," wrote Madison, "is the great southern and northern in-
terests of the continent, being opposed to each other ...the states [arel
divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other
circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate,
but principally from their having or not having slaves.''z°
The abolitionist charge that the Constitution was the transcript of a
nefarious bargain with immorality, which was based on constitutional
language and supported by Madison's comments, made it difficult for op-
ponents of slavery to rely on courts of law in their effort to end it. This
failure to rely on courts, the law and the Constitution as a primary tool
in their reform efforts is merely one example of the general allegation,
made by some modern historians, that abolitionists were unable to use in-
stitutions in their campaign for change. In his admirable book on slav-
ery,"1 Stanley Elkins describes what he feels is the ineffectual quality of
abolitionism by joining it to the politically impotent Transcendentalist
movement.
The thinkers of Concord (the Transcendentalists) .. .were men with-
out connections. Almost without exception they had no ties with sources
of wealth; there were no lawyers or jurists among them; none was a mem-
ber of Congress; they took next to no part in politics at all; ... [Flar
from 'revolting' against the age, Transcendentalism embodied in aggra-
vated form certain of its most remarkable features-its anti-intellectualism,
its individual perfectionism, its abstraction, and its guilt and reforming
zeal. Moreover, the intellectual features of the reform movement most
relevant to this inquiry-abolitionism-very strikingly duplicate those
very features just enumerated . . . What does matter is that the thinking
of those men whom we specifically remember as abolitionists-whose
claim on history rests on their association with abolitionist movement as
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such-should follow the very same pattern (as the thinking of Tran-
scendalists.) 12
The primary allegation is that "the anti-institutionalism so character-
istic of the Transcendentalists reached heights of extravagance in radical
abolitionist"'13 circles rendering them open to the charge of ineffectual-
ness. To the extent that abolitionists were able to use courts and the legal
process, and use them successfully, in combating slavery, the allegation is
wide of the mark. And the abolitionists were successful in the courts to
a surprising degree. Given the fact that the Constitution was a compro-
mise between slave states and free states, giving several protections to slav-
ery; given the fact that prior to 1860 it "is extremely probable that the ju-
diciary commitee [of the Senate] was... influenced in its action regarding
nominations to the Supreme Court by the views of the nominees as to slav-
ery;"' 4 and given the fact that a vocal group of abolitionists openly called
for disunion, connecting abolition of slavery with destruction of the na-
tion in the public mind; given all these facts, it is remarkable that aboli-
tionists were able to use the courts as successfully as they did.
Specifically, the abolitionists were able, through court action, to:
weaken the slave trade; destroy the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793; undermine
the fugitive slave law of 1850; make significant gains for civil liberties
and civil rights; and, finally, through the Dred Scott case, to lay bare the
hypocrisy and intellectual shoddiness of a constitutional system designed
to protect human rights, but based in part on the acceptance of human
slavery.
I. EARLY ABOLITIONIST CouRT ACTION
In 1700, Judge Samuel Sewell of Massachusetts was spurred to attack
slavery publically by the consideration in the General Court of Massachu-
setts of "a petition for the emancipation of two unjustly enslaved Ne-
groes."' 5 It is not dear whether or not the judge sat on the case or what
the outcome was. It is dear that he was inspired by it to write a stinging
attack on slavery. It also seems apparent that the case was the beginning
of legal agitation against slavery in Massachusetts. This is an important
beginning, since "abolition in the Bay State is a particularly suitable subject
12 Id. at 147, 158, 175.
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for investigation because a legend persists that other New England States
were influenced by her example."' 6
The leading abolition case in Massachusetts was the "Quock Walker
Case." It is a case confused by a complex fact pattern, obscure origins and
uncertain effect. However, it is generally hailed as at least part of the suc-
cessful attack on slavery in the courts of Massachusetts. Quock Walker
was alleged to be a runaway slave. In trying to regain possession of his
alleged property, the master and defendant in the suit, Nathaniel Jenni-
son, assaulted the Negro. The Negro brought the action for assault and
battery. There were a number of counter and concurrent suits (six in all)
and various settlements reached. However, the case did reach the General
Court twice, once in 1781, and once in 1783. There is historical contro-
versy as to which case effected slavery the most, but it appears that one
or the other or both together did have some effect on the future of slavery
in Massachusetts.
"There is reason to suspect that the entire episode was planned... with
the hope of bringing the matter to court.' 17  The apparent planner of the
case, both the fact and the law, was the "most prominent attorney in the
county," Levi Lincoln. He was consulted very early in the case, prepared
the pleadings, and arranged the various settlements in order to focus the
issue on the constitutionality of slavery under the declaration of rights.
He argued eloquently that slavery was a violation of human rights. The
role of Levi Lincoln in the Walker trial was one which, at his death many
years later, was remembered along with his position as Attorney General
of the United States under Thomas Jefferson and his appointment (which
he declined) to the Supreme Court by Madison in 1810.18 (John Quincy
Adams subsequently declined the same seat, and Joseph Story, at the age
of 36, was finally appointed to fill the vacancy)."°
A legend has grown around the second Quock Walker case saying that
the charge to the jury [the highest Court's cases were heard before a jury]
by one judge was responsible for ending slavery in Massachusetts. Un-
fortunately for the judge's place in history, it is a fact that slaves continued
to be sold in Massachusetts for several years after the 1783 decision. "Far
from being hailed as revolutionary decisions, affecting the property rights
of thousands of owners, they [the Quock Walker cases] went unnoticed
in contemporary newspapers. The reason for the ambiguous result of the
Walker-Jennison cases is that they were, in all probability, only several of
a series of cases testing the constitutionality of slavery. At the same time
that Levi Lincoln was arguing that slavery was incompatible with the dec-
16 Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More Notes
on the 'Quock Walker Case' Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 118-44 (1961).
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laration of human rights for the benefit of Quok [sic) Walker in Wor-
cester, Theodore Sedwick was making a similar plea for Elizabeth Freeman
in Berkshire County-and with similar results. These freedom cases ulti-
mately had the desired effect. Some Negroes were encouraged to sue for
their freedom; others, convinced that the courts would not return them to
slavery, simply left their masters. As a result, when the first federal census
was taken in 1790, Massachusetts reported that it had no more slaves." 20
While it is unclear just how the judicial attack on slavery in Massachusetts
affected the institution in other parts of the country, there is some indica-
tion that the action did not go unnoticed. According to Jeremy Belknap,
writing in 1788, "the Negroes in Massachusetts and New Hampshire are
all free, by the first article in the Declaration of Rights. This has been
pleaded in law, and admitted."'" And Judge Cushing, famous for his part
in the second Quock Walker case, called this case and its effect to the at-
tention of a justice of the state of Pennsylvania whom he was visiting.22
When organized abolition activity began in earnest in 1831, then there was
precedent for the successful use of courts in the anti-slavery cause.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SLAVE T_ DE
Lieutennant Robert F. Stockton was 26 years old when, in 1821, he was
commissioned by the American Colonization Society to negotiate the ces-
sion of African land for their proposed colony. He was successful in
carrying out his task and the land he obtained became Liberia. Thirty-
five years later, in 1856, Stockton ran for President of the United States on
the North American ticket (the abolitionist wing of the Know-Nothing
Party.) His campaign biography of that year23 speaks as highly of his
Liberia accomplishments as it does of his term in the United States Senate,
his service as first Governor of California, and his role in developing stem
vessels, long guns, and the under water propeller for navel vessels. It
also speaks of his legal efforts to end the slave trade based on his own ag-
gressiveness on the high seas.
American slavers were in the habit of carrying several foreign flags to
disguise their identity when approached by American naval vessels.24
They also, on occasion carried several captains of different nationalities
to go along with the different flags. Lieutenant Stockton's instructions in
1822 were to "capture all vessels, sailing under the American flag, found
engaged in prosecuting the slave trade."25 This direction, he felt, inhibited
20 ZILVERsMIT, supra note 15, at 112-113.
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him in his efforts to supress the slave trade. He therefore captured a
slaver sailing under the French flag (which was, in fact, French) on the
grounds that its cargo made it a pirate.
The ship, the Jeune Eugenie, was returned to the United States for
trial. Stockton retained his friend, and former counsel in the piracy case
of the Marrianna Flora,26 Daniel Webster, to argue the legality of the cap-
ture. Stockton, whose father was a leading member of the New Jersey Bar,
and whose grandfather had signed the Declaration of Independance, sup-
posedly drafted the arguments used by Webster in the case. Mr. Justice
Story, sitting as a circuit judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the opinion Story held that,
[a]fter listening to the very able, eloquent, and learned arguments de-
livered at the bar on this occasion,--after weighing the authorities which
bear on the case with mature deliberation,-after reflecting anxiously and
carefully upon the general principles which may be drawn from the law
of nations to illustrate or confirm them, I have come to the conclusion that
the slave-trade is a trade prohibited by universal law and by the law of
France; and that, therefore, the claim of the asserted French owners must
be rejected.27
According to Bayard, "Lieutenant Stockton was the first in the United
States who ever asserted and acted upon these broad and fundamental prin-
ciples of natural law."28  Unfortunately, though the case supported the
capture of several additional slavers by Stockton, it appears not to have had
a decisive effect. Twenty years later the American slave trade began to
reassert itself once again amid "Confusion on the Bench."'
However, in February of 1841, a similar case was argued and won be-
fore the Supreme Court. The counsel in that case was John Quincy Adams,
"then the most vigorous of all the anti-slavery advocates in Congress, and
consequently, of all statesmen, the most obnoxious to the South."3 0 The
case was United States Schooner Amistad.3' The ship was a slaver which
had been captured by its cargo, whose officers had been killed in the revolt,
and which had been brought to the United States by an American naval
vessel. The Spanish owners of the former slaves demanded their return.
The issue as reported by the press, was whether or not the Court of the
nation had the power to return to slavery men who arrived on American
shore as free. Judge Story, writing for the court, held that the Negroes
should be freed from custody and sent back to Africa.
.2624 U.S. (11 Wheat) 1 (1826).
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Adams' description of his argument contrasts sharply with today's Su-
preme Court practice. "I spoke four hours and a half, with sufficient
method and order to witness little flagging of attention by the judges . . .
The structure of my argument, so far as I have yet proceeded, is perfectly
simple and comprehensive, needing no artificial division into distinct points
but admitting the steady and undeviating pursuit of one fundamental prin-
ciple-the ministration of justice."' The next day Adams argued for an
additional four hours, and the following day he "spoke about four hours
and then closed somewhat abruptly." 3  Adams' successful appeal to jus-
tice pleased the abolitionists. Winning the case was important in their ap-
peal to general principles of law. That they recognized this case as im-
portant is signified by the fact that Adams was retained by Mr. Lewis Tap-
pan 4 who, with his brother Arthur, was a leading financial and organiza-
tional figure in all abolitionist circles between 1830 and 1860.
Through these two court cases, abolitionists were able to establish that
slaves who managed to escape from the slave trade were free, and that
Americans could capture slavers of foreign flags. Both cases were based
on general principles of justice and the rights of man. Both cases judi-
dally recognized the human degredation of slavery. These were important
points for the abolitionists to get into the judicial record.
III. THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW OF 1793
It is around the two fugitive slave statutes, one of 1793, the other of
1850, that the abolitionists made the most significant law. John Hurd pub-
lished a classic treatise on the law of slavery in 1862. In the preface to
that work, he said, "[i]n the greater part of the cases cited in this volume
it has been necessary for the judiciary to determine the operation of the
first and second sections of the fourth Article of the Constitution of the
United States" (the sections pertaining to the fugitive slave laws).85 The
magnitude of the litigation effort is illustrated by the fact that the table of
cases in Volume II of the Hurd treatise contains 480 separate listings.
The trying of so many cases, "the greater part of which" dealt with the
fugitive slave laws and their relation to the Constitution, shows that a
strong anti-slavery bar existed. In fact, a number of prominent abolition-
ist leaders were attorneys who began by trying fugitive slave cases. "Thad-
deus Stevens . . . started out as an abolitionist lawyer defending fugitive
slaves in Pennsylvania, and . . . climaxed his career by fathering that
potentially great bulwark of individual liberty, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.""6  Salmon P. Chases' "Defense of James G. Birney in 1837 for
32 2 WARREN, supra note 14, at 74.
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harboring a fugitive slave brought him into prominence as an antislavery
advocate. '8 7 It was from this start that Chase went on to become an anti-
slavery Senator and Governor from Ohio, a member of Lincoln's cabinet
and, finally, Chief Justice of the United States. James G. Birney, the de-
fendant in the famous case defended by Chase, "abandoned a prosperous
legal practice" for the anti-slavery cause. 8 The case that Birney and
Chase combined on, Birney v. State, 9 is still cited for the proposition that
"guilty knowledge [is] ... a necessary ingredient of crime."" ° A number
of other prominent attorneys served the cause in various capacities. Con-
gressmen Rufus P. Spalding, former judge of the Ohio Supreme Court,
Joshua Giddings from the outskirts of Cleveland, and Albert G. Riddle,
and William B. Stantan as a private attorney, all contributed their legal
talents to the battle against the fugitive slave law.
The effect of this massive outpouring of legal activity was described
by Wilbur H. Siebert, the leading authority of the underground railroad.
Commenting on the value of the Hurd volumes as an historical source,
Siebert states: "[i]n the series of the record of these trials, one may trace
the legal opposition to the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Laws, ...
mark the clash of federal jurisdictions and see the growth of the spirit of
nullification in the North." But the most significant occurance in the
battle was the "decision in the Prigg case, by which efficacy of the law of
1793 was destroyed, and the Southern demand for a new law made imper-
ative." 41
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,42 was decided by a divided court with Mr. Justice
Story acting as Chief Justice in the place of the ailing Taney, writing the
opinion. Prigg was the plaintiff in a suit against the state of Pennsylvania.
His female slave had escaped and one year later he came into Pennsylvania
to seize her and her offspring. The state of Pennsylvania sought to re-
strain him in accordance with its state law. The issue before the court
was whether or not the law of Pennsylvania violated the Constitution.
Prigg claimed it did; Pennsylvania claimed it did not. The Court held
unanimously that the statute violated the Constitution, and that a master's
right to regain his slave was protected by the Constitution.
At first abolitionists were furious against the opinion. The Court had
unanimously upheld the constitutionality of slavery. However, the sec-
37THE LINCOLN LIBRARY OF ESSENTIAL INFORMATION 1792 (1951).
38 B. H. BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE 1830-1844, 39 (1933).
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ond point of Story's opinion angered slavery men. He argued that any
state law dealing with fugitive slaves was unconstitutional whether it hin-
dered or aided their return. Judge Story himself believed that "a great
point had been gained for liberty-so great a point, indeed, that on his
return from Washington," wrote his son, "he repeatedly and earnestly
spoke of it to his family and his intimate friends as being 'a triumph of
freedom'.'4
After an initial heated attack on the Court, the anti-slavery spokesman
quited to an acceptance of the decision. "Undoubtedly, the chief reason
for the equanimity with which the decision was finally accepted was the
rapid realization by the Northern States of the effective weapon which had
been placed in their hands."'44  Now the northern state refused to allow
their government agencies to be used to enforce the fugitive slave law.
For example, within a year of the decision Massachusetts "passed a statute
which made it a penal offense for any state officer or constable to aid in
any way in carrying the Federal law into effect. '45  The effect was a de-
mand by southerners for a new fugitive slave law.
IV. THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT OF 1850
"As a part of the famous compromise of 1850, the Congress of the
United States passed the Fugitive Slave Act. This act [was] one more
anvil upon which the abolitionists were able to forge their antislavery
crusade."'46 Nothing illustrates better than the Oberlin-Wellington Rescue
Case how sophisticated the abolitionists were in their use of the courts to
build support against the fugitive slave law and slavery itself.
The case arose when a Kentucky slave hunter lured a runaway slave
into his custody at Oberlin, Ohio. The slave was taken to Wellington,
Ohio, to be transported out of the state. However, on the road the slave
and his captor were spotted and a demonstration shortly developed. The
slave was rescued and sent on to Canada. The rescuers, thirty-seven in all,
were charged with violation of the Fugitive Slave Act, and two were
brought to trial and convicted in the Federal District Court in Cleveland.
In an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court on a writ of habeas corpus,
that court denied the writ in a 3 to 2 decision. Chief Justice Swain lost his
seat on the court as a result of the decision, but perhaps left "the odium of
inaugurating civil war in this country... upon the South.
47
The final step in the legal strategy was taken in July of 1859, just three
43 1 WARREN, supra note 14, 87.
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months after the conviction had been secured. The counsel for the res-
cuers prepared to bring a counter charge against the slave hunter for kid-
napping. The United States attorney, tired of the constant harrassment
of the public resulting from the unpopularity of the case, agreed to drop
the charges against the "rescuers" if they would drop the charges against
the "kidnappers." Agreement was reached and the rescuers were released.
The effect of the case and the public agitation accompanying it pro-
foundly changed the course of Ohio politics. "The Fugitive Slave Law had
previously escaped criticism in northern Ohio because little attempt had
been made to enforce it there. The events of this case, however, opened
the law and slavery to renewed denunciation in the press, in the church,
and in public mass meetings. It resulted in a strong antislavery, anti-
Fugitive Slave Law plank in the platform of the Ohio Republican Party.
It also led to a great antislavery mass meeting in the Western Reserve on
the slavery issue, and the following year the Western Reserve sent to
Congress men firmly opposed to making further concessions to the slave
power."48 Two of the men subsequently elected to Congress had been at-
torneys for the rescuers.
During the entire period of the legal maneuvering, the attorneys were
busy insuring public support for their cause. The first public meeting was
the "feast of the felons" in which "thirty seven good citizens of Loraine
County, indicated by the Grand Jury ... sat down with their wives and a
number of invited guests to a suptuous repast... Among them were ven-
erable grey-headed men, some of the early settlers of Loraine County-
men who had filled the forest and built the humble log-cabins, school
houses and churches of the wilderness-nobel men, good men, and true
men-men of Puritan and Covenanter stock, of Revolutionary Blood, of
spotless reputation-indicated criminals. '49  This contemporary account
of the situation gives an indication of the intense feeling generated by the
case in the Western Reserve.
Upon conviction, the first two rescuers tried were sent to jail. The
court then proposed to try the cases of the rest of the accused before the
same jury. The defense refused and all defendants were ordered jailed.
From jail the citizens ran a massive protest. They printed a newspaper
called The Rescuer which appeared every second Monday; a column called
"A voice from the Jug" was written for the Cleveland Plain Dealer by one
prisoner; and Sunday school children as well as other visitors came to
shake hands with the prisoners. On May 24, 1859, a mass rally was held
near the jail which was addressed by the Governor, Salmon P. Chase, Con-
gressman Joshua P. Goddings, and by the prisoners themselves from inside
the jail.
418 Guthrie, supra note 46, at 94.
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When the rescuers were finally released, a great celebration was held.
The leader of the rescuers received a one-hundred-salvo gun salute by the
Oberlin Hook and Ladder Company and the Wellington "Sax Horn Band."
"To emancipationists everywhere the speeches of a politically ambitious
lawyer defending, not his clients, but an idea gave 'a fresh impetus to our
noble cause,' in Garrison's words."5 While the activities in the Oberlin-
Wellington case were particularly dramatic and widely known, abolition-
ists across the North were combining legal attacks against the fugitive slave
law with popular support in an effort to build a massive opinion against
slavery.
V. CIVIL LIBERTIES
The protection of civil liberties is primarily a defensive battle. Each
thrust against free speech, free press, academic freedom, or any other right,
must be met or the right will be lost. The anti-slavery forces of 19th
century America recognized the moral and political importance of this task
of protection and joined it to the fight for abolition. "The insistence upon
the moral and legal right of a minority to speak and be heard, with full
protection from suppression or interference, became in time nearly as im-
portant to the [slavery] controversy as the abolition of the slave system."'"
In 1833, Prudance Crandall announced that her school for girls in
Canterbury, Connecticut, would be opened to Negro girls. An immediate
out-cry was heard from the community, led by Andrew T. Judson, an at-
torney and official of the American Colonization Society. It was one thing
to send Negroes to Africa, quite another to let them move into a North
American, white community. Judson secured passage of a state law for-
bidding schools such as Miss Crandall's from operating. For defiance of
that law, the school mistress was arrested. The thrust against educational
freedom had been made.
Arthur Tappan, wealthy businessman, founder of the American Anti-
Slavery Society, and brother of the man who later retained Adams to pre-
sent abolition's argument in the Amistad Case, accepted the challenge and
hired three attorneys to defend Prudance Crandall. Led by Sammuel J.
May, "who was projected into national prominence by his part in the case,"' 2
the abolitionists argued that Negroes possessed an inalienable and consti-
tutional right to education. The prosecution, conducted by Judson, urged
that Negroes were not citizens, and that the Declaration and the Constitu-
tion had never meant to make them citizens. He also argued that the only
result of such a school as Miss Crandall's would be race amalgamation.
Out of court, he commented that the real aim of the school "was to train
50 Guthrie, supra note 46, at 97.
5 1 NYE, supra note 3, at 317.
52 Id. at 106.
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Negro girls as brides for New England Bachelors." 53 The first trial ended
in a hung jury. The second trial ended in a conviction. On appeal, the
conviction was quashed and the abolitionists won thier point.
The next major legal victory won by the abolitionists was the defeat of
an attempt to censure John Quincy Adams by the House of Representatives
in 1842. Though not a court-room battle, this quasi-judicial proceeding
does show an ability and willingness on the part of abolitionists to use
legal reasoning and methods. 4 Russell Nye suggests that this use of the
law by abolitionists represented a division in the movement. "By 1840 the
movement was divided into two fairly well-defined groups, one based on
the moralistic-religious position of Weld, Garrison, and the Lane 'rebels,'
the other on the political-legal position of Birney and his circle. While
the Liberty party and its supporters carried the battle against slavery into
Congress and the courts, the other group seized on popular contemporary
evangelistic techniques .. .,5 The Adams censure case shows that Nye's
allegation is not accurate.
Although Garrison considered the American Anti-Slavery Society his
organization, Biney, Leavitt, Stanton and Weld were responsible for most
of the society's work. It was this Society which effectively popularized
and organized the evangilistic techniques used by abolitionists throughout
the country. 6 In 1841, these four men, seeing that new techniques were
needed to continue the fight, left the organization (to Garrison) nearly
simultaneously. Biney continued his political work with the Free Soil
party. Stanton started a law practice. Weld and Leavitt went to Wash-
ington where they organized the anti-slavery congressmen into an effective
political force and prepared the defense of Adams. The division Nye re-
fers to was not one between personalities, but rather one making a change
of strategy by the same persons, save Garrison, who never changed.
For six days the trial of Adams raged in the House. The galleries
were packed by the public and members of the Senate. Adams spoke bril-
liantly. "Day by day the trial went forward, and night after night Weld
and the old warrior counseled together upon the program of defense for
the morrow."57  Finally the resolution to censure was laid on the table.
58 Id.
54 The assertion that a trial of censure in the United States Congress is a proceeding de-
manding legal knowledge and skill comparable to that required in the courtroom is sup-
proted by the fact that during the 20th century's famous censure trial, that of Senator Joseph
McCarthy, the defendant Senator retained the famous trial lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams,
to prepare his defense. Williams was not allowed to speak on the Senate floor, but he was
allowed to be present and advise his client. During the 1842 proceedings against Adams, the
embattled Congressman's chief advisor was Theodore Weld, the evangelistic abolitionist from
Ohio. E. B. WILLIAMS, ONE M 'S FREEDOM 667 (1962); G. H. BARNES, TE ANTISLAVERY
IMPULSE 1830-1844 (1933).
55 NYE, supra note 3, at 199.
56 BARNES, supra note 46, at 107.
57 Id. at 186.
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The victory was won. Weld wrote: "This is the first victory over the slave-
holders in a body ever yet achieved since the foundation of the government
.., Weld had successfully made the transition from evangilist to legal
advisor.5
Interference with the use of the mails by slave-holders constituted a
thrust at freedom of the press. If the mails could be stopped through state
action, no abolitionist newspaper would ever reach the South. In 1849,
John M. Barrett was arrested in Spartanburg, South Carolina, for bringing
into the state a "paper with the intent to disturb the peace and security of
the state, in relation to the slaves thereof."'  The case was very complex.
Barrett had tried to mail certain documents alleged to be incendiary. He
had also refused to receive a letter allegedly sent to him under a false
name. When the local postmaster refused to open the letter at a trial, he
was jailed. Barrett was allowed to remain free only if he posted a $2000
bond. Once again abolitionists met the challenge. Money for the bond
was raised through the North and preparations were made to defend
Barrett. Before the final case came to trial, Barrett was released. The
issue was becoming too embarrassing to the authorities.
In 1845, the abolitionists lost a case in the New Jersey Supreme Court
which sought to outlaw slavery as a violation of the New Jersey Constitu-
tion. Although the case was lost, abolitionist counsel Alvan Steward,
leader of the New York Anti-Slavery Society, made a strong argument
which sounds familiar to modern ears. Referring to the famous Quock
Walker case, he urged New Jersey to abolish its limited form of slavery as
Massachusetts had done because of "inalienable rights" section of its Con-
stitution. His argument was that "[s~laves are persons and hence to de-
prive them of these natural rights is to violate the 5th amendment [of the
United States Constitution.] The due process clause is thus read in a mixed
technical and substantive sense." 1  Though, as in this case, abolitionists
frequently lost in court, they also often Won. They saw and accepted the
responsibility of defending civil liberties, and in doing so often established
or suggested important principles of law.
VI. DRED SCOTT
Dred Scott vs. Sandford,62 though lost by the abolitionists, was by far
their most ambitious and far-reaching effort in the courts. The tenacity
581d. at 187.
59 ten Broek, EQUALITY UNDER LAW: THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS oF THE FouRTHEENr
AMENDMEN (1947) develops a strong argument that the modern concepts of "due process"
and "equal protection" in the fourteenth amendment can be traced to the legal writings of Weld,
Stanton, and Birney.
60 NYE, supra note 3, at 82.
01 ten Broek, supra note 59, at 79.
2 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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of the organizers of the case is a monument to the creation of test cases.
The inappropriateness of the decision and its damage to the court is a
strong argument for judicial restraint and responsibility. Of all aboli-
tionist efforts, both inside and outside the courts, this case provided the
most convincing evidence to the northern moderates that slavery was a
threat to the Union.
Dred Scott was a slave born in Southampton County, Virginia [home
of Nat Turner), around 1795. He left there with his first master in 1827.
When this master died in St. Louis in 1831, Scott passed to the master's
daughter, who sold him two years later. The new owner was an Army
surgeon named Emerson who was transferred to Illinois in 1834, taking
Scott with him. One year later Emerson was again transferred, this time
to the Wisconsin Territory. Scott married another slave of the doctor and
had a child. In 1838, the surgeon, with Scott, returned to St. Louis where
he died six years later. Scott was left to the surgeon's widow, Mrs. Irene
Sanford Emerson. It was against her that the first Dred Scott case was
brought.
Mrs. Emerson left her new slave with her brother, Henry Blow, anti-
slavery lawyer and well-to-do businessman. It was at his decision and
urging that the first case was brought to court. In that case, Scott, a Man
of Color v. Emerson, Scott's lawyers argued that the time he had spent in
Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory made the former slave a free man.
Their argument was upheld and Scott could then and there have become
a free man. However, lawyers on both sides of the case decided to ap-
peal to get a higher court ruling on the same issue. In 1852, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, Scott v. Emerson63 "reversing its previous practice
by a two to one vote, refused to extend comity and honor the laws of other
states.""
In November of 1853, a new strategy was worked out by the abolition
lawyers in the case. "Until this time no startling novelty had distin-
guished the Dred Scott case; similar pleas in behalf of slaves had been
heard in the state courts throughout the century. '6  However, now Mrs.
Emerson was remarried to Dr. Calvin C. Chaffee, an abolitionist Congress-
man, and her affairs and property were administered by her brother, John
F. A. Sanford of New York. Scott's attorneys filed a charge of assault
against Sanford on behalf of Scott in federal court. The basis of the suit
was the diversity of citizenship between Sanford, a citizen of New York,
and Scott, allegedly a citizen of Missouri. Thus, two important questions
were presented to the court: (1) could a negro be a citizen, and (2) was
the enslavement of Scott a violation of his rights. The lower federal
63 15 Mo. 576 (1852).
S. I. KuTLER, THE DREm Scorr DEacsIONS: LAw OF PoLITIcs x (1967).
O5 Id.
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court found that Scott was a citizen of Missouri and that Sanford had
not violated his rights by holding him in slavery after he had been in
free territory. The case was now ready for the Supreme Court.
The Court heard oral argument in the December term of 1855 and was
about to side-step the entire question when Justice McClean of Ohio, the
only abolitionist on the court and candidate for the first Presidential nom-
ination of the Republican party, decided to write an opinion "reviewing
at length the history of African Slavery in the United States from the Free
Soil point of view."68  The southerners demanded a re-hearing. One year
later, in the December term of 1856, argument was heard once again.
And once again, the court seemed ready to side-step the controversial is-
sues. However, with the defeat of Fremont in the election, the southerners
on the Court felt emboldened to "attempt to settle definitively all ques-
tions with an opinion of the court.""7  Chief Justice Taney agreed to write
the opinion.
First, he held that the lower court had erred and that Scott could not be
considered a citizen, and that therefore the court did not have jurisdiction.
Second, he held that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, and
that therefore Scott could not have become free even if he could have sued.
The Compromise was unconstitutional in that part which made the land
in Wisconsin Territory forever free of slavery. This he declared was dep-
rivation of property without due process of law.68  His point was again
jurisdictional. If Congress lacked the power to make Scott free, then
Scott could not be a citizen and therefore the court could not have juris-
diction. Each of the other judges wrote statements on the case, and there
was not a majority on the reasoning that led to the decision.
The case was a disaster. Even though some credible explanation can
be given for Taney's reasoning69 there is little that can be said in defense of
the result or the method by which it was reached.
When, as in this case, the student finds six judges arriving at precisely the
same result by three distinct processes of reasoning, he is naturally dis-
posed to surmise that the result may possibly have induced the processes
rather than that the processes compelled the result; ... when he discovers
further that the processes themselves were most deficient in that regard for
history and precedent in which judicial reasoning is supposed to abound,
66 Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision it the Light of Contemporary Legai Doctines, AM.
HIsT. REV. 52-69 (1911); KuTLER, supra note 64, at 123.
6 7 Kutler, supra note 64, at xiii.
68 Here, according to Corwin, the vested rights theory grafts onto the due process clause of
the fifth amendment of the Constitution. This was a doctrine in use only in New York and
North Carolina which held that while some due process was merely procedural, other due proc-
ess consisted of rights which could not be eliminated "even by the forms which belong to due
process of law." Wynehamer v. People, 18 N. Y. 378, 420 (1856). This doctrine bears a
distinct similarity to the due process assertions of the Birney, Weld, Stanton theory of law
basing their attack on slavery upon the same clause.
69 See CoRwIN, supra note 66, at 135.
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his surmise becomes suspicion; and finally when he finds that beyond
reasoning defectively upon the matter before them the same judges de-
liberately gloss over material distinctions . . . and ignore precedents that
they have themselves created ... his suspicion becomes conviction.70
The effect on the court was disasterous. It was not until 1870 that it
finally recovered from the distrust it had created. "The Dred Scott deci-
sion cannot be, with accuracy, written down as a usurpation, but it can and
must be written down as a gross abuse of trust by the body which rendered
it."7' The major lesson of the case is that even the court is subject to the
limitations of social and political realities. But also it shows a tenacity
and ingenuity on the part of the abolitionists which sets them distinctly
apart from the reflective and detached Transcendentalist thinkers of Con-
cord to whom Stanley Elkins likes to compare them. There were a number
of hard-headed, realistic and effective men working in the abolitionist
cause.
VII. CONCLUSION
This short review of a few, well-known legal actions prepared, financed,
and prosecuted by abolitionists, should raise serious questions about the
charge that abolitionists were ineffective and isolated members of society.
When Elkins compares abolitionists to transcendentalists, he implies that
they had no "ties with sources of wealth." However, the Tappan brothers
were wealthy silk importers who put the profit of their business, and of a
number of friends whom they converted into the cause of abolition. Elkins
suggests that there were few lawyers in abolitionist circles. However, most
of the men whose names keep reappearing in connection with abolition
were lawyers - Birney, Stanton, Adams, Phillips, Giddings - or were
men willing to work with the law, as Weld did. In the ranks of abolition
were other lawyers such as Chase, Stevens, and the men who tried the
masses of fugitive slave cases.
To the extent that abolitionists were like Transcendentalists, they
should have taken no part in Congress or politics; and yet all major leaders
of abolition, save Garrison and his followers, who never did change,
worked through either the courts, the Congress, where some of the great-
est victories were won, or through political parties. Far from being anti-
institutional and unwilling to revolt, the abolitionists raised questions and
sought answers that struck at the nation's core; and it raised these ques-
tions at the seat of power and in the heart of institutions so insistently
that the nation was finally driven to war by their goad.
Elkins' mistake lies in his identification of abolition with Garrison.
"There is some danger that the builders [in abolitionist circles] may be
70 Id., at 138.
71Id.
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overlooked... This would occur as a result of... concentrating, as Stan-
ley Elkins has done, on the New England branch of the movement with its
close intellectual ties with the Transcendentalists. 17 2  This is a mistake
that Elkins should not have made. He himself quotes part of the following
passage:
The Boston abolitions made the Garrison legend history; but this was their
only great achievement. As advocates for a reputation, Garrison's fol-
lowers were unique; but as factors in the antislavery impulse-at least
throughout the decade of the forties-they and their leader were even less
than negligible; they were 'dead weights to the abolition cause.'
Garrison was equipped by taste and temperment for free-lance journal-
ism and for nothing else. As a journalist he was brilliant and provocative;
as a leader for the antislavery host he was a name, an embodied motto, a
figurehead of fanaticism."
It is more than a mere quibble to consider Elkins' charge. The aboli-
tionists are now being looked to as a model for successful agitation.
Those who are seeking to copy the model must be sure they understand it.
To the extent that Elkins claims abolitionists worked outside of institu-
tions, he clouds the picture and misleads the copiers. The way abolition-
ists used the courts is one example that undermines the charge.
72 Willie Lee Rose, Abolitionists in South Carolina, in THE ANT-SLAVERY VANGAIuD:
NEw ESSAYS ON THE ABoLITIoNIsTs 191 (M. Duberman, ed. 1965).
73 BARNES, supra note 46, at 175.
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